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Consequences of Brexit and Options 





The United Kingdom has opted to leave the European Union. The trade and welfare 
consequences of this decision are large; most studies predict a trade and welfare loss for both the 
UK and the EU. The UK parliament has indicated that it aims for new and ambitious trade 
agreements following Brexit, but has not been explicit what type of trade agreements it 
envisions (except that it should be broad) or with whom specifically. In this paper, we consider 
the UK’s options. We first confirm, in line with existing studies, that the negative trade 
consequences of Brexit are substantial, especially for the UK and also for the EU. After 
reviewing all potential options, we have a simple answer to the question whether the UK has an 
alternative for the existing trade agreement with the EU. The answer is: No. Only a trade 
agreement with the EU can compensate for the negative trade consequences of Brexit. 
JEL-Codes: F130, F140. 
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1. Introduction 
On June 23, 2016, the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union 
(EU), the so-called Brexit. In a letter dated March 29, 2017, British prime minister informed 
the EU of the intention to terminate its EU membership.  
The EU swiftly responded on March 31 that this ‘...creates significant uncertainties that 
have the potential to cause disruption, in particular in the UK but also in other member 
states (p.2).’1 Indeed, the Brexit creates uncertainties on many fronts: political, social, and 
economic. In this paper, we will focus on the economic aspects of the Brexit and highlight 
the consequences of the Brexit on trade flows, and analyse the trade options of the UK.  
From an international trade perspective, the choice of the UK to leave the EU is 
remarkable. Leaving a large free trade area as the EU is most likely trade and welfare 
reducing. Without a new agreement, relative trade barriers will change by making trade with 
the EU relatively more expensive compared to outside-EU trade, resulting in trade creation 
with the non-EU world and trade diversion away from the EU. The balance between these 
developments is most likely trade and welfare reducing, as trade barriers between the UK and 
the largest trading block in the world increase.2 This sombre evaluation is corroborated by 
almost all analyses of Brexit. The estimates range between roughly 1.5% reduction in GDP to 
more than 7%, depending on assumptions made how the Brexit takes place (Baldwin, 2016). 
Only ‘Economists for Brexit’ produced a positive estimate, but this seems to be an outlier in 
the available estimates (see Miles, 2016, p. 31, for an overview).  
The challenge for the UK is to find a new position within the world of trade agreements. 
The letter of the UK prime minister (see note 1) indicates that the principles of the Brexit 
with respect to international trade are outlined in the White Paper of February 2, 2017, which 
says that the UK aims to (p.8) ‘forge a new strategic partnership with the EU, including a 
wide reaching, bold and ambitious free trade agreement...’ and that ‘we will forge ambitious 
free trade relationships across the world’.3 The various comments of politicians indicate that 
                                                      
1 See for the letter of the British prime minister: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_17_ 
article50.pdf. The answer from the EU: EU Draft Guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification under 
Article 50 TEU, Council of The European Union, XT 21001/17, Brussels. 
2 The so-called Kemp-Wan theorem gives the condition for the net effect to be positive: trade must remain fixed 
after the change in membership. So, trade barriers have to adjust in special ways to make this happen (see 







the negotiations will at times become confrontational; the UK links the trade negotiations to 
security issues and Gibraltar, whereas Donald Tusk (EU president) has warned that ‘cherry 
picking’ by the UK will not be accepted by the EU (see note 1).  
In this paper, we will not predict or speculate what the most likely outcome of Brexit 
negotiations will be, but instead analyse the options for the UK with respect to international 
trade. The UK indicated in the White Paper that it would like to ‘forge new trade 
agreements.’ The question we answer in this paper is what trade agreements could be an 
alternative to the current situation of UK’s EU membership. Based on a state-of-the art 
gravity model we will first estimate with our data – value added trade data – what the 
consequences are of Brexit. Next, we will analyse options for the UK that have been put 
forward in several policy discussions – including a trade partnership with the US, or with 
various other parts of the world – and confront those estimates with a (renewed) partnership 
with the EU. Our broad conclusion is simple: the UK has no alternative than a trade 
agreement with the EU unless it is willing to accept a trade reduction.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and our dataset. 
Section 3 presents our estimation results. Finally, section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Gravity equation with counterfactual scenarios 
A well-known and well-established method to estimate the consequences of trade agreements 
(TAs) is the so-called gravity equation (for a survey, see Head and Mayer 2014). This is an 
accepted method to evaluate the effects of changes in variables that in some way affect 
barriers to trade between countries. Key in modern formulations of the gravity models are the 
so-called Multilateral Resistance (MLR) terms. These terms are related to price indices, and 
are important to analyse the effects of a TA between, say, two countries on the rest of the 
trading system. Without these terms, the simulated effects of a TA would only affect the two 
countries involved. With these price index terms present, however, a TA changes the MLR 
terms and thus affect the whole trading system as trade between any pair of countries takes 
place against the background of changed price indices. We provide a simple derivation to 
illustrate how this works.   
We follow Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), as summarized in Van Bergeijk and Brakman 
(2010, p. 9-10) and proceed in 6 steps. 
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Step 1: The first step is an equilibrium equation which says that the value of trade flows from 
country i to j, ݌௜௝ݔ௜௝, should equal the share, ݏ௜௝, that country i has in expenditure of j, ܧ௝: 
݌௜௝ݔ௜௝ ൌ ݏ௜௝ܧ௝, where ݌௜௝ is the import price from i to j. 
 
Step 2: Assuming the familiar constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand structure, it is 
straightforward to derive demand for each individual product and calculate ݏ௜௝, explicitly: 
ݏ௜௝ୀ ൬௣೔ೕ௉ೕ ൰
ଵିఙ
, where ௝ܲ ൌ 	 ቀ∑ ݊௜௜ୀଵ..ே ൫݌௜௝൯ଵିఙቁ
ଵ/ሺଵିఙሻ
 
where ௝ܲ is the exact price index associated with the CES demand structure; σ > 1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties ‘ni’; N is the number of countries. 
 
Step 3: Trade costs are crucial in gravity models. Let ݐ௜௝ ൐ 1 indicate all bilateral trade costs 
from country i to j (man-made and natural costs), then the price in market j equals: ݌௜௝ ൌ
݌௜ݐ௜௝, where ݌௜ is the so-called mill price of a product in the market of origin, i. 
 
Step 4: The gravity model describes total bilateral trade, Tij, for industries, or countries, so we 
have to aggregate across varieties (products):	 ௜ܶ௝	 ൌ ݊௜݌௜௝ݔ௜௝ ൌ ݊௜ݏ௜௝ܧ௝ ൌ ݊௜൫݌௜ݐ௜௝൯ଵିఙ ாೕ௉ೕభష഑, 
where we use ݏ௜௝ୀ ൬௣೔ೕ௉ೕ ൰
ଵିఙ
, and the price including transportation costs.  
 
Step 5: We assume that all goods are traded, implying that the total output of a country j, Yj, 
equals total sales to all destination countries (including the home country): ௜ܻ ൌ
∑ ௜ܶ௝ ൌ௝ ݊௜ሺ݌௜ሻଵିఙ ∑ ൬ݐ௜௝ଵିఙ ாೕ௉ೕభష഑൰௝ , where we use the result of step 4. We can re-write this 






substitute this in the final step of 4 to obtain: 
 
Step 6: A gravity model [by combining step 4 and step 5]: 
௜ܶ௝ ൌ ௜ܻܧ௝ ൬ ௧೔ೕ௉ೕП೔ ൰
ଵିఙ
,          (1) 
Equation (1) is a basic formulation of a modern gravity equation.  
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In empirical research, other variables are included that affect trade barriers, such as a 
common language between i and j, a shared border, similar history (colonies), and most 
importantly for this paper, being part of a common TA.  Note that bilateral trade is not only 
affected by variables describing the bilateral relation between i and j, but also by П௜  and ௝ܲ, 
the MLR terms. These terms depend on all prices in the system. Changes in trade costs 
between two countries thus also affect the rest of the trading system. As a result, we have in 
our simulations two types of effects: those that directly affect the trading partners themselves 
because they exit/enter a TA, and the effects with respect to the rest of the world through the 
MLR terms (price index effects).  
In practice, the estimation of equation (1) is difficult as the MLR terms depend on 
parameters that have to be estimated. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have a custom 
programmed iteration model to find the estimates of equation (1). We follow Anderson et al. 
(2015), as they have developed a more straightforward estimation method (see also Anderson 
and Yotov 2015; Larch and Yotov 2016). A crucial step in their method is to re-estimate the 
model as described in steps 1-6, for the alternative policy scenario, the counterfactual model.  
First, equation (1) is estimated by using importer and exporter fixed effects to capture the 
MLR terms. Using these estimates the implied trade costs, ൬ ௧೔ೕ௉ೕП೔ ൰
ଵିఙ
, are derived. Next, the 
new policy scenario is included by turning on/off, in our case, a TA dummy. In case of 
Brexit, the TA dummy that describes the EU membership of the UK becomes zero. Given the 
estimates, one can calculate the counterfactual implied trade costs and substitute these in the 
expressions for the MLR terms as defined above. This results in counterfactual MLR terms. 
By imposing market clearance, one can calculate the new values of ௜ܻ. In this way, we can 
compare the original (baseline) situation to counterfactual situations and calculate changes in 
trade flows and income.4 
In this paper, we will focus on the so-called ‘full endowment general equilibrium’ trade 
effects, i.e. the change in trade once income and expenditure have adjusted to the new MLR 
terms and counterfactual trade costs (for a detailed discussion, see Larch and Yotov 2015). 
 
                                                      
4 Trade agreements come in all sorts of shapes and forms. In Kohl et al. (2016) we differentiate between various 
provisions in trade agreements and differentiate whether or not a provision is legally enforceable; resulting in 52 
different elements in a trade agreement. Because we do not know how negotiations between the UK and various 
trading blocs in the world will incorporate various elements, we opt for the simple way to describe a TA, i.e. 
with a binary dummy. 
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2.2. Data 
While traditional estimates of the gravity equation rely on gross trade data, a growing 
literature has emphasized the importance of using novel measures of value-added exports 
(VAX) data to account for the international fragmentation of production (see, e.g., Johnson 
and Noguera 2012, Koopman et al. 2014, and Kaplan et al. 2016).  In line with this 
development, we explicitly use data on trade in value-added instead of gross exports. Value-
added data are more relevant for exercises like we present in this paper because changes in 
value added trade are more directly linked to income and welfare of the countries involved.  
Value-added exports are from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), covering 43 
countries in 2014, the most recent year available.5 For a detailed description of WIOD, its 
construction and applications, see Timmer et al. (2015, 2016). The 43 countries covered 
account for more than 85% of world GDP and are listed in Appendix Table A1. Other typical 
gravity-equation controls (bilateral distance, contiguity and common language) are from 
CEPII (Mayer & Zignano 2011). Trade agreement data are from Kohl (2014) and updated 
using the WTO Regional (Preferential) Trade Agreements Database. 
 
2.3. Empirical strategy 
Following Anderson et al. (2015), we estimate the following equation with PPML: 
 
ܸܣ ௜ܺ௝ ൌ ln൫ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝൯ ൅ ܥܰܶܩ௜௝ ൅ ܤܴܦܴ௜௝ ൅ ܶܣ௜௝ ൅ ܨ௜ ൅ ܨ௝     (2) 
 
where VAX is the value added exports of origin i to destination j at destination prices; DIST 
is the bilateral distance between the trade partners in kilometres; CNTG is a dummy which is 
1 when i and j share a common border and 0 otherwise; BRDR is a binary variable equal to 1 
if international trade is involved and 0 if the country is trading with itself (see step 5 in 
section 2.1); TA is 1 when i and j have a trade agreement and 0 otherwise; Fi and Fj represent 
origin and destination fixed effects, respectively, and are the MLR terms.6,7 
                                                      
5 Our results are qualitatively similar when using alternative data sources, specifically, (i) gross trade and 
production data generously provided by Mario Larch as used in Anderson et al. (2015) and Anderson and Yotov 
(2016), and (ii) the OECD Trade in Value Added Database (TiVA). All results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
6 Output and expenditure (origin and destination GDP in traditional gravity equations; see equation 1) are fully 
captured by the MLR terms in the baseline scenario, and recalculated based on the counterfactual trade costs 
(see Anderson et al. 2015). 
7 The baseline parameter estimates (robust standard errors) are -0.601 (0.047) for ln(DIST), 0.518 (0.137) for 
CNTG, -3.920 (0.148) for BRDR and 0.258 (0.084) for RTA; all estimates are significant at the 1% level. 
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In the following section, we will present the results of a series of different scenarios that 
can be calculated with the methodology outlined above.  
First, we consider the case of a “hard Brexit”, in which the UK terminates its EU 
membership and all trade agreements to which the UK belonged as member of the EU.8 In 
order to calculate the counterfactual trade costs, the binary TA variable will be “switched 
off”, i.e. from 1 to 0, for all country-pairs involving the UK and another EU member. An 
alternative option might be a so-called “soft Brexit”, in which the UK leaves the EU and 
retains its membership in all the EU’s trade agreements with countries such as Canada, 
Mexico and South Korea.9, 10 
Second, once a “hard Brexit” is in place, we explore which trade agreements the UK can 
pursue in its “Global Britain” strategy. One possible option is that May and Trump negotiate 
a US-UK trade agreement. We will show that such an agreement would only have a minor 
role in reducing the UK’s losses. To add insult to injury, even the most extreme case of a 
“Global Britain” in which the UK has a TA with all non-EU countries would still not be 
sufficient to offset the UK’s post-Brexit loss in trade.  
Finally, one may ask how severe the trade impact of Brexit would be in light of other 
potential threats to the international trade regime. We will consider the case of the US 
abandoning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the dissolution of the EU, 
and, as a worst-case scenario, the collapse of all trade agreements worldwide. 
  
3. Results 
A full overview of all results is presented in Appendix Table A2 (percentage change 
compared to baseline, i.e. pre-Brexit) and Appendix Table A3 (change in absolute values). 
 
3.1. Great Brexit 
The set up for our discussion of the various scenarios is relatively straightforward.  Ranked 
on the horizontal axis by the size of their economy, as measured by ln(GDP), we show for 
each country in our sample the effect of the change in the trade agreement status on value 
                                                      
8 Note that all EU members’ trade agreements are centralized at the EU level. The UK does not have trade 
agreements that are independent and separate from the EU. 
9 For the purpose of our analysis, it does not matter whether the UK signs a new bilateral agreement with current 
EU TA partners, or (re)negotiates its membership in existing agreements between the EU and its TA partners. 
10 While there is some debate as to the merits of a ‘Norway’ construction (i.e. free trade, but no labour mobility), 
such a scenario cannot be computed with our counterfactual gravity equation setup. The reason is that that TA 
variable is already 1 for UK-EU members in the baseline, so that nothing would change in the counterfactual 
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As Figure 1 makes clear, a hard Brexit scenario has a strong negative impact on the value-
added exports of the UK, decreasing by almost 18%, because trade with the (remainder of 
the) EU becomes more expensive.  It shows the asymmetric impact of a hard Brexit in which, 
not very surprisingly, the exports and thereby the UK economy are hit much harder than the 
other EU member states or non-EU countries. These countries also experience a trade 
decline, but to a lesser extent than for the UK, because the UK market is smaller than that of 
the EU. The impact is also stronger if one focuses on VAX, as we do here, when compared 
with the impact of on gross trade as can be seen by comparing Figure 1 with the results for 
gross trade in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The main reason for this difference (which holds 
for all our scenarios) is that the value-added data take the intricate production value chain 
linkages between, in casu the UK and the rest of the world, into account whereas the gross 
trade data do not do so.      
Figure 2 gives a detailed or ‘zoomed in’ view of the hard Brexit results as shown by 
Figure 1 so as to highlight that (mainly) other EU countries are also negatively affected by a 
hard Brexit in terms of their value-added exports. This holds first and foremost for Ireland, 
where value exports decrease by more than 3%, but also a number of other EU countries see 
their value-added exports drop by 1-2%. Note that non-European countries are not really 
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Britain” where the UK by inter alia establishing new trade agreements arguably would be 
able to off-set the effects of Brexit for the UK economy.  It is to this scenario that we turn to 
next. 
 
3.2.  Brexit with Global Britain 
In this sub-section, we assume that a hard Brexit has materialized and then look into the 
effects of alternative trade agreements by the UK on the value-added exports for the UK and 
the other countries in our sample. Inspired Donald Trump’s vocal support for Brexit and early 
talks by Trump with May after he became president of the USA, Figure 4 shows the effects 
of a bilateral trade agreement between the UK and the USA. Since we assume that this trade 
agreement is struck with the full Brexit in place, one should compare the outcomes in Figure 
4 with those reported in Figure 1. The main effect of the trade agreement between the UK 
and the USA is that it increases the value-added export for both countries by approximately 
2%. For the UK, this implies that the negative impact of Brexit is only marginally offset by 
such a bilateral trade agreement with the USA (compare the -18% in Figure 1 with the -16% 
in Figure 4).  Easier access to the US market compensates the trade loss of Brexit to some 
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policy makers in the UK. In terms of our analysis, where as we stated before factor mobility 
is not taken into account, the no doubt long and difficult negotiations that would result in a 
Norway-type of deal between the UK and the EU would for the UK at best replicate the 
current trade agreement it has with the EU as an EU member! Brexit would then lead to new 
situation where the UK’s trade agreement with the EU would essentially copy the current 
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The UK decided, following a referendum in 2016, to leave the EU. The negotiations between 
the UK and EU to determine under what conditions the Brexit should take place, started in 
March 2017. From an international trade perspective, the Brexit is puzzling, as almost all 
studies predict that trade with the EU will decrease significantly. 
The UK government states that it is aiming to replace the current UK membership of 
the EU by other, broad, trade agreements. However, at this stage it is not clear what a new 
trade agreement would look like and which countries could be involved in these new 
agreements.  
This paper reviews the alternatives that the UK government has. The central question 
we try to answer is: does the UK have an alternative compared to the current membership of 
the EU, that is, an alternative that would compensate for the large negative trade shock of 
Brexit. Reviewing the options that have emerged in discussions on Brexit, such as a broad 
agreement with the US, China, or all countries except the EU, our conclusion is simple: the 
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SVK Slovak Republic 
SVN Slovenia 
SWE Sweden 
TWN  Taiwan 
TUR Turkey 









































Table A2: Full Endowment General Equilibrium Effects for Counterfactual Scenarios (continued on next page) 
Abbreviation Description 
Full Endowment General Equilibrium Effect on… (%) 
Gross Trade Value Added Exports 
“Hard Brexit” “Hard Brexit” 
“Soft 
Brexit” UKUSTA UKWORLDTA NoNAFTA NoEU NoTA 
AUS Australia 0,09 0,04 0,05 0,03 0,51 0,13 0,11 -2,56 
AUT Austria -0,22 -0,63 -0,63 -0,64 -0,65 -0,59 -14,58 -14,54 
BEL Belgium n/a -1,28 0,16 -1,29 0,11 -1,24 -16,50 -16,46 
BGR Bulgaria -0,10 -0,54 -0,54 -0,54 -0,56 -0,50 -12,23 -12,22 
BRA Brazil 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,98 0,27 0,59 -0,06 
CAN Canada 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,01 0,43 -11,87 -0,02 -12,63 
CHE Switzerland 0,17 -0,93 0,14 -0,94 0,10 -0,88 -13,94 -15,84 
CHN China 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,85 0,19 0,60 -5,20 
CYP Cyprus n/a -0,58 -0,58 -0,58 -0,60 -0,52 -11,24 -11,20 
CZE Czech Republic n/a -0,78 -0,79 -0,79 -0,82 -0,74 -15,33 -15,28 
DEU Germany -0,51 -1,20 -1,24 -1,21 -1,28 -1,16 -16,26 -16,18 
DNK Denmark -0,36 -1,01 -1,03 -1,02 -1,06 -0,95 -16,13 -16,03 
ESP Spain -0,48 -1,17 -1,19 -1,18 -1,22 -1,08 -15,43 -15,30 
EST Estonia n/a -0,45 -0,45 -0,45 -0,46 -0,41 -10,31 -10,35 
FIN Finland -0,28 -0,67 -0,69 -0,67 -0,71 -0,61 -14,46 -14,37 
FRA France -0,58 -1,75 -1,79 -1,76 -1,84 -1,69 -17,38 -17,30 
GBR United Kingdom -8,68 -17,46 -13,08 -15,52 -6,46 -17,39 -16,46 -16,36 
GRC Greece -0,28 -0,70 -0,72 -0,71 -0,74 -0,64 -14,55 -14,44 
HRV Croatia n/a -0,63 -0,63 -0,64 -0,65 -0,59 -11,25 -11,26 
HUN Hungary -0,22 -0,70 -0,71 -0,71 -0,73 -0,65 -15,05 -14,99 
IDN Indonesia n/a 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,58 0,12 0,19 -8,55 
IND India n/a 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,76 0,15 0,43 -10,37 
IRL Ireland -1,25 -3,12 -3,18 -3,14 -3,26 -3,05 -15,79 -15,68 
ITA Italy -0,39 -0,95 -0,97 -0,96 -1,01 -0,89 -16,05 -15,94 
JPN Japan 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,70 0,17 0,36 -2,12 
KOR South Korea 0,05 -0,44 0,06 -0,44 0,03 -0,37 -5,00 -15,65 
LTU Lithuania n/a -0,47 -0,47 -0,48 -0,49 -0,44 -10,95 -10,99 
LUX Luxembourg n/a -1,07 0,14 -1,08 0,10 -1,03 -17,79 -17,72 
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LVA Latvia n/a -0,49 -0,49 -0,50 -0,51 -0,45 -10,74 -10,77 
MEX Mexico 0,04 -0,58 0,07 -0,59 0,04 -8,69 -6,16 -18,62 
MLT Malta n/a -0,90 -0,92 -0,91 -0,95 -0,83 -16,09 -15,94 
NLD Netherlands -0,66 -1,28 -1,31 -1,29 -1,35 -1,24 -15,31 -15,27 
NOR Norway 0,18 -0,67 0,08 -0,67 0,06 -0,62 -7,63 -9,04 
POL Poland -0,28 -0,74 -0,76 -0,75 -0,78 -0,69 -15,55 -15,46 
PRT Portugal -0,34 -0,99 -1,00 -1,00 -1,03 -0,91 -14,80 -14,69 
ROM Romania -0,30 -0,68 -0,69 -0,68 -0,71 -0,62 -13,95 -13,87 
RUS Russia n/a -0,56 0,08 -0,56 0,06 -0,51 -7,79 -7,75 
SVK Slovakia n/a -0,60 -0,60 -0,60 -0,62 -0,56 -14,32 -14,30 
SVN Slovenia n/a -0,59 -0,59 -0,59 -0,61 -0,55 -12,61 -12,64 
SWE Sweden -0,33 -0,80 -0,82 -0,81 -0,85 -0,74 -13,80 -13,71 
TWN Taiwan n/a 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,56 0,12 0,18 0,37 
USA United States 0,17 0,08 0,07 0,92 0,87 -8,69 0,47 -8,80 
EU average Average per EU28 
Member excl. GBR 
n/a -0,92 -0,83 -0,92 -0,86 -0,87 -14,39 -14,45 
EU total Total effect for EU28 




Table A3: Full Endowment General Equilibrium Effects for Counterfactual Scenarios in 
Absolute Terms 
Abbreviation 




Brexit” UKUSTA UKWORLDTA NoNAFTA NoEU NoTA 
AUS $513 $653 $456 $7.195 $1.782 $1.608 -$36.409 
AUT -$2.613 -$2.624 -$2.635 -$2.713 -$2.443 -$60.452 -$60.294 
BEL -$7.743 $944 -$7.801 $656 -$7.506 -$99.760 -$99.554 
BGR -$375 -$378 -$378 -$391 -$345 -$8.511 -$8.507 
BRA $1.644 $1.517 $1.499 $17.908 $4.859 $10.790 -$1.143 
CAN $407 $597 $239 $6.871 -$191.053 -$242 -$203.284 
CHE -$6.928 $1.005 -$6.983 $729 -$6.530 -$103.691 -$117.835 
CHN $17.766 $15.738 $16.431 $179.628 $40.550 $127.487 -$1.101.592 
CYP -$107 -$108 -$108 -$111 -$97 -$2.087 -$2.079 
CZE -$2.261 -$2.284 -$2.279 -$2.358 -$2.128 -$44.341 -$44.182 
DEU -$43.172 -$44.379 -$43.509 -$45.720 -$41.453 -$582.693 -$579.895 
DNK -$2.915 -$2.969 -$2.938 -$3.062 -$2.748 -$46.554 -$46.263 
ESP -$14.323 -$14.559 -$14.438 -$15.024 -$13.313 -$189.320 -$187.816 
EST -$137 -$136 -$138 -$140 -$126 -$3.144 -$3.155 
FIN -$1.772 -$1.816 -$1.786 -$1.876 -$1.625 -$38.321 -$38.094 
FRA -$40.397 -$41.420 -$40.692 -$42.575 -$39.131 -$402.126 -$400.208 
GBR -$439.434 -$329.243 -$390.745 -$162.654 -$437.713 -$414.418 -$411.887 
GRC -$1.109 -$1.133 -$1.118 -$1.171 -$1.012 -$22.890 -$22.718 
HRV -$297 -$297 -$299 -$306 -$278 -$5.268 -$5.273 
HUN -$1.021 -$1.030 -$1.029 -$1.064 -$950 -$21.864 -$21.767 
IDN $370 $433 $335 $4.841 $974 $1.616 -$71.649 
IND $1.204 $1.205 $1.109 $13.586 $2.634 $7.749 -$185.361 
IRL -$8.125 -$8.273 -$8.181 -$8.489 -$7.937 -$41.146 -$40.865 
ITA -$19.635 -$20.050 -$19.797 -$20.715 -$18.248 -$330.196 -$327.884 
JPN $2.446 $2.502 $2.231 $28.270 $6.722 $14.462 -$85.954 
KOR -$8.895 $1.182 -$8.970 $644 -$7.513 -$101.367 -$317.402 
LTU -$204 -$203 -$205 -$210 -$188 -$4.724 -$4.740 
LUX -$1.536 $205 -$1.548 $146 -$1.476 -$25.574 -$25.485 
LVA -$181 -$180 -$182 -$187 -$167 -$3.956 -$3.968 
MEX -$4.891 $615 -$4.973 $326 -$72.834 -$51.666 -$156.173 
MLT -$137 -$140 -$139 -$144 -$126 -$2.454 -$2.431 
NLD -$12.176 -$12.423 -$12.269 -$12.789 -$11.778 -$145.101 -$144.742 
NOR -$2.931 $371 -$2.954 $251 -$2.713 -$33.447 -$39.652 
POL -$4.399 -$4.489 -$4.435 -$4.638 -$4.087 -$92.461 -$91.942 
PRT -$1.949 -$1.973 -$1.965 -$2.037 -$1.789 -$29.131 -$28.901 
ROM -$1.432 -$1.454 -$1.444 -$1.503 -$1.315 -$29.522 -$29.355 
RUS -$10.913 $1.628 -$11.004 $1.155 -$9.949 -$151.964 -$151.105 
SVK -$742 -$742 -$748 -$767 -$693 -$17.820 -$17.798 
SVN -$300 -$300 -$303 -$309 -$281 -$6.448 -$6.462 
SWE -$4.117 -$4.209 -$4.150 -$4.345 -$3.816 -$70.790 -$70.306 
TWN $317 $374 $287 $4.170 $866 $1.364 $2.729 
USA $10.509 $9.835 $123.707 $116.639 -$1.166.768 $63.091 -$1.181.451 
EU total -$173.175 -$166.418 -$174.513 -$171.844 -$165.057 -$2.326.655 -$2.314.686 
